Imagine being a successful attorney and a patriot who answers the call when his old homeland requires it. You first sign one of the founding documents of your newly established country and then become its ambassador for a few years. After a falling out with the government, you decide to move back to your homeland, run in an election and become a member of the Czechoslovak parliament. Only for your homeland to subsequently say that you are not (and, in fact, never were) a Czechoslovak citizen, thereby stripping you of your parliamentary seat. How is this possible? And, more importantly, what does this have to do with a 2025 appellate decision by the Minister of Interior of the Slovak Republic? Well, the unfortunate fate of a now-forgotten Czechoslovak diplomat is key to understanding why the 2025 ministerial decision is problematic.
The Slovak Minister’s Recent Appellate Decision
In his June 2025 decision,[1] the Slovak Interior Minister has rescinded, on appeal, a decision of the Ministry to deny Slovak citizenship through ancestry to an applicant, who had applied for it under the 2022 amendment of the Slovak Citizenship Act. The reason for the initial refusal had been that the applicant was unable to demonstrate his ancestor’s Czechoslovak citizenship.
Under said provision,[2] an applicant may apply for Slovak citizenship, if they can demonstrate both birth within what is now the Slovak Republic and that their ancestor held Czechoslovak citizenship at some point in their life. It is oftentimes the second requirement that brings the most trouble, as determining who was and who wasn’t a Czechoslovak citizen is a very complicated legal process that requires knowledge of ancient Austro-Hungarian legislation, international treaties from the 1920s, as well as jurisprudence of contemporary legal scholars and case-law of the Czechoslovak Supreme Administrative Court.
For purposes of the case at hand, the issue came down to whether one could still become a Czechoslovak citizen automatically when the country was founded in 1918, despite the fact that they’d naturalized in the United States prior to the creation of Czechoslovakia. More specifically, the decision deals with the legal question of whether Hungarian citizenship was a pre-requisite for Czechoslovak citizenship.
The minister holds that the law at the time did not require Hungarian citizenship for Slovaks to have become Czechoslovak citizens and he bases this assertion on Section 2 of the Constitutional Act no. 236/1920 Coll.
Under said section, those born on Czechoslovak territory were presumed to be Czechoslovak citizens, unless proven that they had acquired another citizenship by birth. A plain reading of this provision does indeed support the notion that one could perhaps base their Czechoslovak citizenship solely on their place of birth and that Hungarian citizenship was no pre-requisite to becoming a Czechoslovak citizen. But does this interpretation hold in light of jurisprudence from the 1920s and 1930s?
How Did One Become a Czechoslovak Citizen in 1918/1920?
The author of this article has tackled the issue of Czechoslovak citizenship among Slovak emigrants extensively, namely in this older blogpost, as well as in his academic thesis for his Masters of Laws degree (see Chapter 3.1).
In essence, virtually all of the rules for citizenship after the dissolution of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were laid down in the peace treaties signed after the conclusion of World War I and followed the ius sanguinis principle, as is tradition on the Old Continent. This means that descent, rather than place of birth, determines your citizenship.
When it came down to the old empire, the easiest way to tie someone to one of the newly formed countries through descent was to use an (until then) obscure legal status that tied each former Austro-Hungarian citizen to a specific town within Austria-Hungary – the so-called “Right of Residence/Domicile” (domovské právo/Heimatrecht/községi illetőség/prawo swojszczyzny/pertinenza…).
These rules were then incorporated into Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitutional Act. Most Slovaks became Czechoslovak citizens under Section 1(1) by holding the Right of Residence within a Czechoslovak municipality continuously from 1 January 1910 until the Constitutional Act came into force in 1920.[3] Nevertheless, between 1918 and 1920, all that was necessary to be considered a Czechoslovak citizen was the Right of Residence within a Czechoslovak municipality.[4]
So, what about Section 2 and its presumption based on the person’s place of birth?
The true meaning of this presumption was essentially to make sure that no one born in Czechoslovakia would end up stateless due to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The way that this presumption functioned was two-fold: First, it made sure that where the established rules (ie. Section 1) provided no clear answer as to one’s citizenship, they would simply become a Czechoslovak citizen if they were born in Czechoslovakia. Second, the presumption had also applied where one had claimed that they had fulfilled the conditions under Section 1 (namely that they held the Right of Residence in a Czechoslovak municipality) but where they were simply unable to prove this due to lack of documents or records.[5] This was especially important in Slovakia, where (unlike in Czechia) records of the Right of Residence were not regularly kept.
Nevertheless, the courts at the time rejected the notion that one’s citizenship could be presumed under Section 2, where there was evidence that the person was not or could not have been a Czechoslovak citizen.[6] This goes to the core of the issue – birth on Czechoslovak territory under Section 2 did not in-and-of-itself make someone a Czechoslovak citizen. On the contrary, it merely established a so-called rebuttable presumption of one’s Czechoslovak citizenship. This presumption could then be rebutted by other evidence that person could not have become a Czechoslovak citizen.
One Czechoslovak Diplomat’s Fate
As alluded to in the introduction, the most problematic aspect of the Ministry’s decision is the 1931 case of Dr. Karel Pergler, a Czechoslovak diplomat. This signatory of the Pittsburgh Agreement, one of the founding documents of Czechoslovakia, was born in what is now the Czech Republic, had moved to the United States with his family and eventually became an attorney in the New Country. In 1906, Dr. Pergler had naturalized in the United States, thereby losing his Austrian(-Hungarian) citizenship pursuant to an international treaty between the United States and Austria-Hungary.
In the immediate aftermath of the foundation of Czechoslovakia, no one stopped to think whether Dr. Pergler was in fact a Czechoslovak citizen. He was appointed the first ambassador of Czechoslovakia to the US, then on to Japan, was issued a diplomatic passport, awarded the Czechoslovak Revolutionary Medal by President Masaryk and finally elected to the Czechoslovak Parliament in 1929. Furthermore, he had his Czechoslovak passport renewed by the embassy in 1928.
Nevertheless, in 1931, the special Electoral Court had ruled[7] that Dr. Karel Pergler had never been a Czechoslovak citizen, despite the fact that he was born in Czechia and had long held various government functions. One of the arguments that Pergler had used in his defense was the fact that he was born in Czechoslovakia and thus had to be presumed a citizen under Section 2 of the 1920 Constitutional Act.
The panel of twelve judges (eleven of whom were elected by the Parliament), with the Chief Judge of the Supreme Administrative Court presiding, outright rejected the idea that Pergler could benefit from the presumption of Czechoslovak citizenship under Section 2. The ruling is very clear in that the purpose of Section 2 was to prevent statelessness, rather than to afford Czechoslovak citizenship to someone, who had previously lost his Austrian citizenship through naturalization.
While the ruling makes clear that the issue of Dr. Pergler’s citizenship was merely a preliminary one and that its ruling was limited to certifying his election as a member of parliament, one can hardly imagine the Supreme Administrative Court making a different decision at the time if it were to make a ruling on Dr. Pergler’s citizenship itself.
What Does This Mean for Potential Applicants?
As shown above, the author of this article believes that it is legally incorrect to apply a presumption of Czechoslovak citizenship to ancestors who have naturalized in the United States prior to 28 October 1918 – their loss of Hungarian citizenship and thereby their right of residence serves to rebut their presumption of citizenship established by their birthplace, as shown in the cited Electoral Court case from 1931.
Contemporary caselaw does not give an explicit answer regarding those ancestors who had lost their citizenship without the acquisition of a new citizenship (such as through absence or marriage for females), thus becoming otherwise stateless. Hence, for those ancestors, the author of this article believes that presuming their Czechoslovak citizenship is a reasonable interpretation of Section 2.
But, at the end of the day, what difference does it make if the Ministry holds a different interpretation of these ancient laws? Deciding who they grant Slovak citizenship to is their prerogative entirely.
The issue is a much deeper one and lies in the fact that oftentimes, reinterpreting the law in an attempt to make its effects seem more fair or less strict tends to lead to more problems down the line. Hence, a possible misinterpretation of the law in the interest of some applicants could open the door to future disputes regarding the legitimacy of their citizenship. In this context, it is important to realize that while the Ministry does have general administrative discretion in who they grant citizenship to, they have little discretion when it comes to making a determination of whether the conditions for granting citizenship have been fulfilled.[8] Thus, granting citizenship to someone who does not fulfill the conditions to be granted Slovak citizenship could possibly lead to future disputes as to whether such citizenship is legitimate.
It is true that the Citizenship Act considers the granting of citizenship to be an irrevocable act and that such citizenship is protected by the Slovak Constitution.[9] Furthermore, the Citizenship Act only lists four possible cases, where the grant of Slovak citizenship is considered to be void – virtually all require fraud on part of the applicant or the commission of a crime.[10]
Hence, to actually and effectively dispute a person’s Slovak citizenship acquired through grant of citizenship, one would have to argue that the Ministry’s interpretation of the law was so egregious that it either caused the whole process to be null and void or that it constituted deliberate misconduct that rose to the level of a criminal offence (such as abuse of powers of a public official[11]). Both of these alternatives are very far-fetched and it is difficult to imagine that a court would view it this way.
It should be noted, Slovak (and Czech) authorities have been known to dispute the citizenship of individuals, even where they had considered them citizens for many decades. While the courts generally rule in favor of these individuals, this is often after a prolonged legal battle.[12] To be clear, though, the cited cases involved individuals who had claimed their citizenship through birth, rather than through grant by the Ministry. Paradoxically, being explicitly granted citizenship results in more protection of one’s citizenship, as it (among other things) establishes more trust that the government had done its homework.
At the end of the day, the granting of citizenship is more of a political decision than a legal one – mainly due to far-reaching discretion afforded to the Ministry.
At the same time, Section 2 is something that the Ministry should long have applied and relied on, when it comes to proof of Czechoslovak citizenship. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a Slovak birth certificate should suffice to show that an ancestor was, in fact, a Czechoslovak citizen. The application of Section 2 only becomes problematic when there is evidence that one simply could not have fulfilled conditions under Section 1.
So, What Is The Takeaway?
The fact of the matter remains – whether or not the Ministry is correct in its interpretation of Czechoslovak citizenship legislation, it appears that they will consider a Slovak birth certificate sufficient evidence of Czechoslovak citizenship and will likely approve such citizenship applicants.[13] Nevertheless, applicants relying on this new interpretation must be aware that their citizenship was granted on rather “shaky” grounds and could attract challenges in the future if there is explicit evidence that their ancestor had lost their Hungarian citizenship prior to 1918.
Mgr. Samuel Durovcik
lawyer at BRUNCKO & STRAKA, advokati s.r.o.
[1] Appellate decision of the Minister of Interior of the Slovak Republic dated 24 June 2025, no. SL-OLVS-2025/006324-002.
[2] Section 7(2)(j) of the Act no. 40/1993 Coll, on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic, as amended by Act no. 72/2022 Coll.
[3] Section 1 also provided other ways of becoming a Czechoslovak citizen, however, these are not quite relevant to the question at hand.
[4] Some colleagues contend that it is disputable whether the decisive moment for Czechoslovak citizenship was 28 October 1918 or 16 July 1920. The author of this article believes that the decisive date is indeed 28 October 1918. This is supported not only by Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court, Boh. adm. 4714/25, but also by other case law, incl. Judgment, Boh. adm. 1065/21, which held that on 28 October 1918, the Austro-Hungarian legal order had ended, a new Czechoslovak legal order was established and with it came Czechoslovak citizenship. This is further supported by contemporary legal literature, see Verner, Státní občanství a domovské právo republiky Československé, 1947, p. 13. For more detailed analysis, see Chapter 3.1 of the author’s academic thesis.
[5] See Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court dated 13 November 1922, Boh. adm. 1650/22.
[6] See Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court dated 16 May 1931, Boh. adm. 9270/31, Judgment dated 10 September 1932, Boh. adm. 10.002/1932.
[7] See Resolution of the Electoral Court dated 24 February 1931, case no. 28/31, transcript/copy published at https://www.psp.cz/eknih/1929ns/ps/stenprot/112schuz/s112001.htm.
[8] See Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic dated 23 November 2016, case no. 2Sžo/99/2014.
[9] Article 5(2) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.
[10] Section 8b of the Slovak Citizenship Act.
[11] Section 326 of the Slovak Penal Code.
[12] See https://spectator.sme.sk/business/c/litigation-and-arbitration-in-slovakia-largest-law-firms-2025; Judgment of the Administrative Court in Bratislava dated 23 July 2025, case no. 7S/61/2024; Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court dated 12 August 2009, case no. I. ÚS 385/07; Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court dated 1 October 2014, case no. I. ÚS 2486/13.
[13] This decision does have some limited precedential value under Section 3(5) second sentence of Act no. 71/1967 Coll., Code of Administrative Procedure.